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Anticipation may be seen as structured by images and representations, an approach that
has informed recent work in science and technology studies on the sociology of
expectations. But anticipation, as a capacity or characteristic, is not solelymanifested in the
form of representations, evenwhere such representations of the ‘not yet’ are performative
in nature. It also comprises material capacities, technological, biophysical and affective in
nature. The politics of anticipation is shaped by how these symbolic and material
capacities, and the forms of agency theymake possible, are distributed. As anticipation is an
environmentally distributed capacity, it is suggested that the politics of anticipation is also
an environmental politics. A conceptual framework for analysing anticipation as comprised
of environmental capabilities is introduced, and ﬂeshed out using a case study of energy
infrastructure planning from the UK. Key elements of this framework include the concepts
of anticipatory assemblages and future horizons or ‘styles’ of anticipation.Working through
the case study as an empirical example of a conﬂict concerning the politics of anticipation
and of ‘environments’, it is demonstrated how the relationships between styles of
anticipation are materially constitutive of such conﬂicts.
ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The central role of anticipating the future in social life is attested to by recent research in science and technology studies
(STS) (e.g. Berkhout, 2006; Jasanoff & Kim, 2009; Ruivenkamp & Rip, 2011). Much work in this ﬁeld (e.g. [82_TD$DIFF]Borup, Brown,
Konrad, & van Lente, 2006) draws on earlier research within future studies on the role of images and representations in
shaping perceptions and beliefs about the future (e.g. Bell & Mau, 1971; Polak, 1973). However, anticipation includes more
than acts of representation and their effects on how people perceive future possibilities. This is recognised in studies that
have explored the performative function of promises and other forms of publicly enacted expectations (Brown et al., 2000).
But the material aspects of anticipation – its capacity to draw virtual futures into the present and make them actually
effective – extend beyond language. Anticipation is dependent on capacities of bodies and of socio-technical apparatuses,
distributed throughout the environments of social action. This includes the living and geo-physical systems of the Earth
(Miller & Poli, 2010), and the technological devices and infrastructures which are interwoven and imbricated with social
practices (Thrift, 2004). Further, anticipation is also dependent on emotion and desire (Brown, 2005), which can coalesce in
the form of positive and negative forms of attachment (Berlant, 2011) to people, objects and ideas.er Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
s, Emptying the future: On the environmental politics of anticipation, Futures (2016),
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or sustainability studies) has been able to recognise this dual dimension of anticipation has been questioned by some (e.g.
Anderson, 2010a; p. 17). A focus on language and representation continues to ‘humanise’ anticipation in a way that fails to
acknowledge its ‘more than human’ dimensions. When anticipation conceptualised as conscious intention or orientation is
placed in the foreground, the ways in which material assemblages are implicated in anticipation are pushed into the
background. In this paper, I explore how understanding these ‘more than human’ dimensions of anticipation can give us a
more comprehensive understanding of what is at stake in the politics of anticipation, and of the sense in which it is also an
environmental politics.
That such dimensions can be politically signiﬁcant is not difﬁcult to demonstrate. Bodily and social routines, for example,
create reliable expectations about the reproduction of social reality. The scripts written into infrastructures and technical
devices organise spaces in ways that allow such routines to go on. This produces spaces of relative reliability, predictability
and security that support the acquisition of important capabilities by individuals and by groups acting together, whether at
work, at home, or in public life. In turn, these capabilities make possible effective agency, in the sense of enabling actors to
shape their environments and the lives livedwithin them. But the socio-material organisation of anticipation is not a neutral
process: it distributes unevenly and unequally the capabilities required by actors in order to inﬂuence the present and the
future. While taming some uncertainties about what will happen, such processes can also intentionally or unintentionally
move uncertainties around or create new ones, as in, for example, the organisation of assembly lines (Dudley,[83_TD$DIFF] 1997).
This political aspect of anticipation also connects directly to how the social and material environment helps produce
explicit anticipations. For example, ongoing activities of anticipation select certain aspects of these environments as ‘public
things’ (Honig, 2012), objects of common concern, through which the future then becomes framed explicitly as an issue for
the present. Conﬂicts over the intergenerational distribution of assets, over howa nation should produce energy, or about the
signiﬁcance of synthetic biology and nanotechnology for what it means to be human are all, at one level, debates about the
social distribution of capacities for anticipation and over the injustices which may be produced by inequalities in this
distribution. At the same time, what becomes a ‘problem’, and how, is a political question that reﬂects the outcome of how
previous activities and processes of anticipation have been patterned, andwhich actors have been able to draw on particular
anticipatory capabilities. If contemporary politics is, at one level, about ‘colonising the future’, then understanding [84_TD$DIFF]how the
means of anticipation [85_TD$DIFF]are distributed can help us understand both the genealogy of particular ‘public things’, and also the
injustices and injuries to which necessarily selective framings of the ‘not yet’ can lead.
In this paper, I have two goals. First, to contribute to the theoretical vocabulary throughwhich the diversity of material as
well as representational elements of anticipative capabilities can be understood. Second, to draw on this contribution to help
understand the environmental politics of anticipation as arising from conﬂicts, not just between distinct visions of the future,
but between different styles of anticipation or future horizons. Such conﬂicts, as intimated above, are signiﬁcant because of
how they reﬂect inequalities in the distribution of capabilities needed to inﬂuence individual and collective futures, and also
because of how, through such conﬂicts, some aspects of social and material environments are foregrounded as things of
public concern and others as not. I draw on an empirical case study and previous theoretical contributions [86_TD$DIFF](Groves, 2015) to
help think through the relationships between material and representational anticipatory capacities and their political
signiﬁcance.
2. Materialising futures-in-the-making
We can take anticipation (in the broadest possible sense) to refer to the capacity of an organised system to incorporate
projected future states into its present functioning, as away of orienting ormodulating its activity. This deﬁnitionmeans that
anticipation is a capability of living systems more broadly and not just a feature of intentional conscious states in humans
(Miller, Poli, & Rossel, 2013). Deciduous trees, for example, anticipate falling temperatures inwinter through their sensitivity
to shorter day length (Rosen,1985; p. 8). In the sense that theymay ‘hesitate’ between potential bifurcated future states, this
may also be said to be true of metastable non-living systems, insofar as they are capable of novelty [87_TD$DIFF](Groves, 2010). Where
human activity differs from other forms of anticipation is commonly taken to be in the degree of active reﬂexivity through
which humans may prepare for alternative future possibilities. But there is also a signiﬁcant difference in [88_TD$DIFF]how social futures
are anticipated implicitly and materially as well as intentionally, through explicit representations of possible futures. For
example, [89_TD$DIFF]socially-inculcated bodily habits anticipate future states (Weber & Varela, 2002), and scripts written into
technologies constrain future performances of practices, for example (Akrich, 1992).
Understanding [90_TD$DIFF]human anticipation therefore requires that we analyse how socially-organised action and representation
are patterned at several distinct levels. At the most concrete, empirical of these levels, anticipation has been the object of
extensive study, particularly in the form of speciﬁc representations of future socio-technical developments. Consider
nanotechnology, for example. For over 15 years, STS scholars have catalogued and analysed the use of images,metaphors and
vignettes by enactors of nanotechnologies to create and reinforce future expectations (e.g. Bensaude-Vincent, 2004;
Ruivenkamp&Rip, 2011), which constitute future imaginaries throughwhich are built group and institutional identities, and
to help create social coalitions (Mordini, 2007). This, in turn, shapes the ‘issue space’ which deﬁnes, here and now, the
potential social signiﬁcance of nascent technological developments. In this way, technologies and the social futures that they
promise are speculatively constructed as public things, objects of concern, around which often equally speculative ethical
debates are then constructed (Nordmann,[91_TD$DIFF] 2007) (Fig. 1).Please cite this article in press as: C. Groves, Emptying the future: On the environmental politics of anticipation, Futures (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2016.06.003
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things by future imaginaries, the same is not so true of the more material and largely implicit dimensions of anticipation. To
redress the balance, a theoretical move can be made here analogous to that made by geographers and STS scholars in recent
years with respect to the ‘more than human’ elements through which a common socio-natural-technical world is
constituted.
For example, Braun and Whatmore (2010) argue that social science is still wrestling with the humanist prejudice that
social reality is solely an effect of human behaviour and intentions. Technology and nature, by contrast, appear as ‘others’ of
humanity and thereby of the social. They call instead for a perspective inwhich technology is viewed as actively constitutive
of the social and political realms, rather than just being an object of concern within politics. Inﬂuenced by this perspective,
others have called for attention to how ‘socio-natural assemblages’ exert an inﬂuence alongside humans in co-producing
their world (Ranganathan, [93_TD$DIFF] 2015).
Just as ‘more than human’ perspectives on socio-natural assemblages focus on how these assemblages help to produce
social reality, so a similarmaterial perspective on futures can help us understand howcertain futures become explicit objects
of common concern, and how the capabilities to inﬂuence these processes, and with them, the present as well as the future,
are differentially distributed. Futures-in-the-making (Adam & Groves, [94_TD$DIFF] 2007), and the complex interplay of forces that shape
them, must become the focus of scholarly interest, rather than futures already made (as images, promises, representations).
How would politics look if we took this constitutive role of the material as well as the represented, performative future
seriously? In line with Braun and Whatmore’s question ‘of what are collectivities and collective actions made?’, we might
ask: of what is anticipation made? The answer to this questionwill shape any subsequent account given of what the politics
of anticipation might look like. But as anticipation is reliant on capabilities ‘wired in’ to the environments in which
subjectivity emerges, the politics of anticipation must also be an environmental politics. First, because of how anticipatory
capabilities are distributed through this environment, which creates unequal relations between subjects (individual and
collective). Second, because these relations inﬂuence the selection processes through which only some aspects of these
environments become ‘public things’ with futures that emerge as objects of concern.
Some conceptual resources exist throughwhich thematerial and representational aspects of anticipation can be brought
together. Future horizons (Adam&Groves, 2007) and ‘styles of anticipation’ (Anderson, 2010b)make it possible to representPlease cite this article in press as: C. Groves, Emptying the future: On the environmental politics of anticipation, Futures (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2016.06.003
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help organise future imaginaries. For example, religious hermeneutics, empirical methods or styles of theory-building in
natural or social science, narrative reasoning about the lives of others, and mathematical techniques all allow the past and
present to be connected and made sense of in distinct ways in the light of anticipated futures. Religious rituals,
administrative routines, routinized care for family members or political activism, for their part, all contribute to the active
shaping of futures. Such ways of knowing and of acting combine to help construct more fundamental tropes which underlie
distinct concrete imaginaries and thus ultimatelymake speciﬁc representations of the future possible. These tropes organise
the temporal direction and logic of relationships between past, present and future. Some examples might be the future as a
divinely pre-ordained individual fate, as offering the possibility of universal material progress, or as the fully-determined
product of past events. In this way, future horizons or styles of anticipation contribute horizons of meaning to social
practices. They help deﬁne the present yet always point beyond it at the same time (Luhmann, 1976).
Foucauldian ‘histories of the future’ could therefore be envisaged, genealogies which describe how the future becomes a
‘problem’ for the present in different places and at different times, as a result of the emergence of distinct future horizons or
styles of anticipation ([95_TD$DIFF]Rabinow, 2003: 18) . Such histories would be related to, yet distinct from, the histories that have
hitherto been written of the ways in which the future has been represented and imagined with the aid of different forms of
expertise (Andersson,[96_TD$DIFF] 2012; Seefried, 2013). If such a Foucauldian history of future horizonswere to bewritten, it would have
to avoid limiting itself to comparing the forms through which potential futures are represented as public things.
Future horizons are not free-ﬂoating cultural structures, any more than are imaginaries and representations. They are
always already stitched into material environments, both socio-technical and socio-natural. Often, these environments
appear in social science as tools or resources, that is, as only having instrumental value. Yet they are also have a [97_TD$DIFF]constitutive
role, particularly as they are composed of systems which also anticipate futures. For example, scripts written into
technological devices and infrastructures order space and train bodies (Thrift, 2004, 2008). Subsisting alongside imaginaries,
future horizons or styles of anticipation have implicated within them a ‘technological unconscious’. Through the
technological devices and infrastructures onwith which social practices are interwoven, futures are not yet represented but
are instead ‘prehended’ (Michael, 2000), as the condition of their being represented at all. Through the mediation of
technologies and then also of knowledge practices, speciﬁc aspects of the social and natural worlds become salient for
anticipation.
The material context of anticipation is not just socio-technical, however. It is also environmental in the sense that it
includes biophysical systems, through which is produced the ‘where’ (the interwoven experienced and biophysical strata of
place) of social practice that, ontologically speaking, precedes its ‘what’ (Buell, 2009; p. 44), i.e. its social and technical
aspects. If biophysical systems can be counted as anticipatory to some degree [98_TD$DIFF]– as shaping their present through embodied
expectations of the future (Rosen, 1985) [98_TD$DIFF]– these systems are also experienced by humans (producing the lived realities of
place, for example) in ways that enable and constrain social practices and their technological components. Tim Ingold
describes the routines and location-speciﬁc qualities of practices, or ‘taskscapes’ (Ingold, 1993) through which socio-
technical orders are sewn into landscapes (Ingold, 2011). Representations of the future thus arisewithin an environment that
is socio-technical and biophysical, and are interwoven with [ 99_TD$DIFF]a multi-layered ordering of space as well as time.
This dimension points to a fourth environmental aspect of future horizons. The subjects who are participants in practices,
manipulators or users of technologies, and the inhabitants of places are produced alongside these implicit modes of
anticipation, even as they help to produce them. They are invested subjects, whose identities are bound upwith anticipations
of the future as well as traces of the past, embodied subjects whose engagement with socio-technical-natural environments
is affective and emotional ([100_TD$DIFF]Groves et al., 2016). Affect and emotion – in the form of hope, fear, longing or anxiety – alongwith
attachment to or disavowal of particular practices, technologies, places future imaginaries or representations should thus be
an additional dimension of any ‘history of the future’ that goes beyond representations, underlining how imaginaries are
‘products of reason lined with desire’ (Romanyshyn, 1989a, 1989b).
Anticipatory representations and material elements may [101_TD$DIFF]therefore be thought together as heterogeneous combinations
or assemblages (Marcus & Saka, 2006) [102_TD$DIFF]of components through which space as well as time are ordered. It is these
combinations, I would suggest, that we should understand, alongside knowledge practices of various kinds, as the content of
future horizons or styles of anticipation (we can use these concepts interchangeably). [103_TD$DIFF]Such assemblages hang together in
speciﬁc ways at different times and in different places. A history of how the future became a ‘problem’ told through such
assemblages would need to differentiate, as Adam and Groves (2007) have suggested, between distinct [104_TD$DIFF]ways in which
anticipation ‘hangs together’. Adam and Groves do this in terms of eschatological, closed, open, empty and abstract future
horizons. These [105_TD$DIFF]represent abstract patterns made up of diverse examples of practical, material and representational
elements. Through such patterns, the future is brought into the present in a speciﬁc manner to order relationships between
past, passing present and the not-yet. These patterns are abstract, yet not abstract in the way that a concept is when
contrasted with the empirical instances it covers. Rather, they are abstract in the same sense as a diagram, as originally
articulated by Foucault and then developed by Deleuze. The diagram is a ‘disposition of centres and channels of power, of
deﬁnition of the instruments and modes of intervention of power, which can be implemented in hospitals, workshops,
schools, prisons’ (Foucault, 1991; p. 205). Foucault saw this exempliﬁed in the Panopticon, which was not just a
representation of power, but an abstract plan for its realisation in the social ﬁeld which would produce, over time, regular
predictable effects.[106_TD$DIFF] Deleuze, in his book on Foucault, foregrounds the future-taming orientation of the diagram, calling it aPlease cite this article in press as: C. Groves, Emptying the future: On the environmental politics of anticipation, Futures (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2016.06.003
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not above, but within the very tissue of the assemblages they produce’ (Deleuze, 2006; p. 37).
To clarify further what is meant by a diagram of anticipation, we can use an analogy with Romanyshyn’s (1989a, 1989b [107_TD$DIFF])
analysis of a diagram that primarily orders space but also provides a template for cultural interpretations of the relationship
between past, present and future. He locates in the Renaissance the birth of linear perspective in art, which uses vanishing
point and distance point together to locate objects within an image on the same plane. This way of organising space replaced
the multiple perspectives evident in earlier medieval art,[108_TD$DIFF] thus forming, Romanyshyn argues, [109_TD$DIFF]the material basis of a
characteristically modern imaginary of space but also of the future. He describes how this diagram organises the way the
relationship between the subject and its world comes to be represented within European cultures, lifting the subject out of
the lived immersion in sense impressions that was manifested materially in medieval multiple perspective paintings. The
observer is positioned as a spectator outside the space thus represented (Romanyshyn, 1989a, 1989b), recalling the ancient
Greek deﬁnition of the theoros (fromwhich ‘theory’ comes) as a non-participating observer at a religious festival (Gadamer,[110_TD$DIFF]
2009).
This diagram implicates within it speciﬁc ‘environmental’ conditions that are reproduced (with evolving historical
variations) over time in European, colonial and then global cultures. These include technological capacities and knowledge
practices (ways of reproducing representational forms, from the draughtsman’s desk to the computer aided design package),
but also the lived relationshipwith the socio-naturalworld of any participant in linear perspective (as ‘outside’ it), and ﬁnally
an affective relationship to this world, that of the disconnected explorer, conqueror, or sovereign individual (Welsh, 2000).
Exploring what the analogues of such diagrams might be in the case of anticipation is the subject of the case study that
follows. I examine how treating anticipation as constituted by assemblages that include both material and representational
elements can help us understand better the nature of the politics of anticipation. I show, on the one hand, how this approach
can help us appreciate the forces through which particular forms of anticipation help to create social coalitions on the basis
of differing representations of the future and the material forms of anticipation that support them. On the other, I discuss
how distinct styles of anticipation shape environmental conﬂicts—ﬁrst, by helping to distribute power unequally between
different social coalitions, and second (and as part of this process) by shaping how particular aspects of the environments of
anticipation become ‘public things’, explicitly imagined futures (inmy case study, energy security) that then become objects
of concern. This strategy is foreshadowed to some extent in Romanyshyn’s work, insofar as he suggests that, during the
Renaissance and thereafter, linear perspective inﬂuences emergent imaginings of the future as a ‘space of points and plotted
trajectories’ (Romanyshyn, 1989a, 1989b). This spatialized future is described by the historian Hölscher (1999) as the future
as such, a totality of possibilities, to be contrasted with the religiously inspired concepts of individual fates through which
Western antiquity and the medieval period tended to makes sense of the future. Adam and Groves (2007) echo
Romanyshyn’s analysis in their description of ‘present futures’ as snapshots of future trends taken from a present which is
itself abstracted from temporal becoming, in a similar way to the ‘window’ of subjectivity through which Romanyshyn’s
linear perspective assemblage constructs the ‘outside world’
3. The politics of anticipation: energy infrastructure planning in the UK
My case study concerns energy demand forecasting in the UK, and the relationships between distinct anticipatory
assemblages that developed in the course of a particular energy infrastructure siting conﬂict. Drawing on interviews with
siting campaigners and document-based research [111_TD$DIFF](Groves, Munday, & Yakovleva, 2013; Groves, 2015) I show how the
production of represented futures as public things, as matters of concern, is dependent on the dominance of particular
anticipatory assemblages, and the ways in which their speciﬁc combination of material elements help constrain or exclude
other anticipations of the future. In this way, capacities to inﬂuence the future are redistributed, and the environment of
anticipation is translated selectively into a set of objects of interest which hide other possible objects of concern from view.
The necessity of planning for medium to long-term future energy needs has, in the last couple of decades, increasingly
been framed around multiple issues, including the cost of energy, the need to reduce CO2 emissions to mitigate
anthropogenic global warming (AGW), and security of supply. Energy security has often been presented as the keystone of
this ‘trilemma’, as an urgent matter of ‘keeping the lights on’ (DTI, 2006). In policy responses to this problem, the future is
brought into the present chieﬂy through the socio-technical apparatus of demand forecasting, a combination of knowledge
practices, techniques and particular socio-technical apparatuses (such as modelling software, demand measurement
technologies, and so on). Like Romanyshyn’s linear perspective, this assemblage produces a disembodied view, a ‘present
future’ in which is represented a snapshot of the future as the necessary product of a [112_TD$DIFF]set of known mechanisms. This then
allows the future to be cast in a concrete, congealed form, such as a demand scenario.
In the UK, energy privatisation and deregulation in the 1980s created a private transmission network operator (TNO) called
National Grid (NG) whose statutory public responsibility was to maintain and expand gas and electricity transmission
infrastructure. Part of these duties was the production of annual ‘ten-year statements’ (National Grid, 2005), which informed
government policy to help ‘assess risks to theUK’s future gas and electricity supplies’ (Department for Business Innovation and
Skills (BIS), 2009, unpaginated). Using past data and other (e.g. economic) forecasts, these reports set out conjectural scenarios
about the near and medium term. The future thus constructed was one in which possibilities were translated, through the
processing of available data, into probabilities. On the basis of the past data mobilised by demand forecasting, systemic risks
(such as underinvestment in distribution infrastructure) are identiﬁed and then risk management decisions taken.Please cite this article in press as: C. Groves, Emptying the future: On the environmental politics of anticipation, Futures (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2016.06.003
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enables demand forecasts to be translated, via intermediary processes, into siting decisions, buttressed via the ‘presumption
of development’ (Cowell & Owens, 2011: 63). Forecasting enables the future to be represented as dependent on demand,
treated as an independent variable subject to natural laws inferred from past data, and linked to other future scenarios.
Cowell and Owens have argued that ‘narratives of necessity’ shape and are shaped by demand forecasting, linking the need
for energy security to the need for economic growth (2011: 15). [113_TD$DIFF]Mechanisms of demand growth are, for example, linked to
the expectation that economic growth will continue.
Inwhat follows, I show how these anticipatory assemblages can come into conﬂict with others in siting disputes. Linking
two new liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) terminals in the port town of Milford Haven in west Wales to the UK gas network in
England, the South Wales Gas Pipeline (SWGP) was built in the period 2003–08 by NG.[114_TD$DIFF] Building new infrastructure to
accommodate imports of liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) from sites in Qatar was seen as necessary to ensure that [115_TD$DIFF]future risk of
gas undersupply in relation to did not eventuate. The SWGP was proposed as a central part of this strategy.
The background to the SWGP was, as noted above, the privatisation of energy production and distribution carried out in
the UK in the 1980s, which has been used as a blueprint by other nations around the world (Hope, 2008; pp. [116_TD$DIFF]9–10).
Decentralisationwas, however, accompanied by a form of recentralisation. New centres of calculation (Latour,[117_TD$DIFF] 1987), such as
NG’s head ofﬁces in the British Midlands, were created that employed forecasting to render potential futures, in Scott’s
(1998) terms, standardisable and legible.
A speciﬁc mode of anticipating energy futures thus consolidated itself around a redistribution of expertise, in the form of
particular knowledge practices and the socio-technical infrastructures of devices and networks onwhich they relied (Barry,[118_TD$DIFF]
2001). These forms of knowledge united an understanding of the future as quantiﬁable risk with auditing practices and
utilitarian welfare-economic frameworks (Power, 1997). Expertise and socio-technical apparatuses combined here to
reinforce existing divisions of labour and process ﬂow within planning governance, creating [119_TD$DIFF]examples of what have been
called ‘planning cascades’ (Owens, 2004). Within such a cascade, once strategic need has been identiﬁed on the basis of
forecasts of future risk, then additional steps in choosing what to do are, essentially, about where the infrastructure
necessary to serve this need will have to go (rather than about, say, ﬁnding opportunities to reﬂect further on the nature of
strategic need). This marriage of forecasting expertise with planning governance creates a decision-making apparatus of a
kind that reﬂects styles of governance that have gradually evolved since the emergence of the ‘social state’ in the late 19th
century (Porter, 1995; Rose, 1999). The style of anticipation expressed through these arrangements [120_TD$DIFF]then diagrams, maps or
constructs the future as abstracted and as emptied.
Just as linear perspective, for Romanyshyn, locates all objects on a single plane, the goal of seeking an optimal means of
providing for predicted demand ﬂattens the future. By plotting the future as a space of a single predictable trajectory, an
assemblage of technologies and practices constructs the future as resembling the past by continuing observed trends in the
value of a given independent variable (such as aggregated energy demand). Creating the possibility of a narrative of
necessity, this combination of anticipatory technologies and practices renders in the process certain public things
imaginable and others not. Demand scenarios render the future tangible in the form of a limited set of interlinked problems,
such as how tomaintain services to consumers (‘keeping the lights on’), how to sustain economic growth (‘an impoverished
Britain in 2020) and how to maintain energy security (‘dependence on foreign imports). Other future possibilities, such as
whether demand should be managed in order to reduce the externalities of economic growth (including AGW), or whether
energy security could turn out to mean very different things to different social groups, [121_TD$DIFF]either within countries and globally
(Hildyard, Lohmann, & Sexton, 2012), become, as a consequences, less imaginable.
This style of anticipation does not just anticipate by abstracting, however; it also empties the future at the same time as it
directs attention towards a restricted set of system variables. This is realised in two ways: ﬁrst, the commensuration of
outcomes, and second, the mapping of decision points. If anticipating through abstracting ﬂattens the future, it does so by
relating past, present and future events to each other inways “where qualitative differences no longermatter whenweighed
against their calculated quantitative identities” (Romanyshyn, [122_TD$DIFF] 2012). Quantitative measures of risk and beneﬁt allow
expected outcomes to be rendered commensurable with each other (Espeland & Stevens,[123_TD$DIFF] 1998) in terms of a common
measure (such as money, embodied in the expected cost of building infrastructure to ensure energy demand is met versus
the risk, or expected probable cost, of not meeting it).
At the same time, this mapping creates a punctuated trajectory for decision-making (Guyer, 2007). Emptying the future
means that the future is not simply constructed as a totality of possible events (Hölscher,1999), aroundwhich imaginaries and
narrativesofnecessitycanthenbeconstructed. If abstractingmakescomparisonbetweendifferent futureoutcomespossibleby [124_TD$DIFF]
constructinga spaceofpossibilities, emptyingmakespossible a seriesof choices thatmightchange this spaceofpossibility, thus
superimposing newmaps of the future over old ones. Here, anticipation is no longer aboutmapping trajectories passively (and
thus anticipating ‘what’s coming’), but about anticipating choices that will have to be made to optimise outcomes, while also
anticipating the new trajectories thatmight result from these decisions. For example, the process of planning and constructing
the SWGP was undertaken against the backdrop of a ten-year statement on demand, but key decisions (such as on where
individual pieces of infrastructurehad to be sited, on the acceptabilityof constructing apipeline throughaNational Park, and so
on) had to be takenwithin speciﬁc timeframes in order to keep open an optimal future (inwhich energy supply capacity could
meet projected demand). At the same time, the future thus projected becomes chargedwith affect: it is not simply anticipated,
but anticipated with anxiety—as suggested by the recurrence of the phrase ‘keeping the lights on’ as the core of a future
imaginary in which scarcity, due to increased demand and insufﬁcient supply, threatens ‘our way of life’.Please cite this article in press as: C. Groves, Emptying the future: On the environmental politics of anticipation, Futures (2016),
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different anticipations of the future and distinct imaginaries. One of the central differences between the style of anticipation
that shaped NG’s ‘narrative of necessity’ and that which can be traced in the arguments and narratives of campaigners
concerns the respective roles of socio-natural environments in helping to anticipate futures. In contrast to styles of
anticipation that abstract and empty the future, community-based campaigns coalesced around lived futures (Adam and
Groves, [94_TD$DIFF] 2007). Like themultiple perspectives ofmedieval painting as contrastedwith the linear perspective developed in the
Renaissance, lived futures set up future narratives around [125_TD$DIFF]a multiplicity of lived experiences of place and community,
interpreting potential futures through histories told at various levels. The disembedded and portable futures produced
within centres of calculation reﬂect only the state of seclusion (Callon, Lascoumes, & Barth, 2009) in which knowledge
workers and the variables they model are placed. The governance of aggregated energy demand is dependent on networked
centres of calculation (Barry,[118_TD$DIFF] 2001) through which results are passed and interpreted: NG, OfGEM, what was (in the early
2000s) the advisory Joint Energy Security of Supply Working Group (JESS) (Department for Business Innovation and Skills
(BIS), 2009), and so on. Through a series of formalised interactions within secluded settings, a consensual scenario and set of
responses to it are constructed.
For campaigners, however, the future is dependent on place. Affective and socio-natural components of anticipation
therefore move into to foreground, both as providing anticipatory capabilities and, as time goes on, as public things of
concern. Campaigners identiﬁed aspects of their immediate environmentswhichmade it possible to anticipate a secure lived
future. One interviewee described the village she lived in as ‘a country village’, ‘quiet, no trafﬁc, it didn’t even have [126_TD$DIFF]
streetlights’, with rural landscapes that could be reached easily via back lanes and quiet roads: ‘you know, there’s a playpark
that way, they [the children] can go mix, mingle with the children from the village’ (Interviewee 11). Such elements, it was
felt, were imperilled by the narrative of necessity surrounding the SWGP, as two campaigners stated in separate interviews
[AUTHOR]:
We’ve never had anything, the only thing we’ve ever had is the fact that we’re rural [ . . . ] But when you go up to March
Hywel Mountain, which is practically a sacred mountain around here, up here you looking smack at it. So that area, we
used to go up there, it’s God’ s own country, you look out and you can see nothing, only mountains all way across to
Brecon. That’s been totally destroyed. (Interviewee 1)
[127_TD$DIFF]And I would say it’s a bit like somebody who had a beautiful house, and it became occupied by a huge serpent [ . . . ] and
unfortunately it goes through every single room of my house. There isn’t one piece left here. I had all these rooms in the
countryside, all my most precious places, and that pipeline had gone through every single one of them. (Interviewee 5)
Abstracting and emptying futures performs a ﬂattening and linearising of the future comparable to that performed upon
space in Romanyshyn’s account of linear perspective. Campaigns against the SWGP, on the other hand, [128_TD$DIFF]emerged from
assemblages of practices, attachments to place and community, and to speciﬁc socio-technical arrangements that [129_TD$DIFF]were
organised as lived futures. The diagram of lived futures is spiral and fractal, rather than linear. The narratives within SWGP
campaigners’ interviews bend back upon themselves in reﬂecting on potential futures in relation to particular pasts, and
then in interpreting the past through possible future outcomes. [130_TD$DIFF]Such narratives have, for their dramatis personae, not just the
narrator but also a set of heterogeneous objects of concern (like other people, places, communities, and institutions). Each of
these objects of concern also has its own narrative, its own singular future and thus its own needs and vulnerabilities. This
interdependence of linked narratives spiralling onward through time makes some kind of juxtaposition of multiple
perspectives necessary in trying to anticipatewhat will happen and tomake decisions accordingly. Here, shared imaginaries
are supported by an environmental and technological unconscious that locates and embeds them in space and in time
(Fig. 2).
[131_TD$DIFF] rom within lived futures, connection and attachment make it possible to deal with uncertainty by structuring
anticipation. Rhythms of living conducted in places andwithin communities form its material and affective basis. The future
is known through the practices through which life goes on within interwoven landscapes and taskscapes (Ingold, [132_TD$DIFF] 1993) in
which the embeddedness of practicematters.Where siting conﬂicts occur, they can [133_TD$DIFF]therefore beginwith an attempt tomake
sense of the signiﬁcance of howabstracted/emptied futures are translated into reorderings of spatial and social relationships
in the present. The planning cascades Owens (2004) analyses prescribe how these disembedded futures become re-
embedded, occupying and re-ordering space and with it, the relationships between the objects of concern through which
lived futures are expressed.
As interviews with campaigners in the case of the SWGP demonstrate, conﬂicts may thus be generated around the
uncertain potential for threats to health and/or environment embodied by new infrastructure. These uncertain and often
contested risksmay be the initial focus for campaigns, but thesemay then subsequently develop around actual or anticipated
threat to the coherence of lived futures, as the interlinked narratives of places and people are disrupted [87_TD$DIFF](Groves, 2015)]. As
the two interview extracts above show, the construction of infrastructure in place introduces a dynamic condition of
uncertainty, disrupting patterns of anticipation.
The interview extracts also suggest that lived futures organise the space of public things differently. Abstracting and
emptying the future takes as its orienting point a problem of predicting future system states and optimising responses in
ways that create new,[134_TD$DIFF] preferred system states. Energy security represents a public thing in this sense, an object of common
concern, even if its exact meaning remains contested (Kruyt et al., 2009). For campaigners at various ﬂashpoints along thePlease cite this article in press as: C. Groves, Emptying the future: On the environmental politics of anticipation, Futures (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2016.06.003
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Fig. 2. Diagrams of anticipatory assemblages.
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sense of social reality at a series of distinct, though often interconnected levels, and which anticipated through their
constitutive imaginaries a variety of local, regional and even international futures. Among the themes of these narratives
were climate change, the physical safety and economic security of often socio-economically deprived communities, and the
preservation of community attachments, including landscapes and routes through them [87_TD$DIFF](Groves, 2015). As Vanesa Castan
Broto argues, in her study of the motivations and activities of environmental activists in Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, what
often emerges out of conﬂicts rooted in the disruption of place and community (and, I would argue, of anticipated futures) is
a particular kind of public thing—a desired future in which a solidaristic relationship between the parties and their distinct
orientations towards the future is forged, inwhich (for example) an industrial developer is ‘internalised’ into a community by
aligning its goals with the preservation, enhancement and long-term sustainability of a community’s capabilities ([135_TD$DIFF]Broto,
2013). Akin to a process ofmourning, thismove fromdisrupted attachment to some formof re-attachment reﬂects a desire to
recompose a lived future.
The source of conﬂict here lies, in the ﬁrst place, in the experience of being unable to maintain the coherence of styles of
anticipation embedded in place and collectivities. Capacities and capabilities through which lived futures are expressed are
often already unequally distributed. Capacities needed to inﬂuence one’s future and to contribute to caring for the futures of
one’s objects of concern may not be available to the same degree to different actors (a difference which may track across
various dimensions of social inequality). The translation of abstract and empty futures into new orderings of spatial and
social relationships (through the planning and construction of infrastructure, for example) can modify this distribution of
capacities by creating new uncertainties. By enabling some imaginaries of the future (e.g. demand scenarios) to be
superimposed over others, abstracting and emptying the future enable in turn certain aspects of the social, technological and
natural environment to become public issues and not others.
In the case of the SWGP, the material and symbolic consistency of a heterogeneous assemblage of knowledge practices,
technologies, centres of governance and affects allows ‘energy security’ to be created as a public thing, a matter of universal
concern and anxiety. The superimposition of abstracted and empty futures over lived ones is expressed symbolically and
rhetorically in the public contest of imaginaries (the ruination of communities versus energy insecurity, for example), and
materially in the translation of future imaginaries into physical infrastructure, facts on the ground. The conﬂicts to which
these processes give rise are experienced (as the interview extracts above suggest) as an example of what Nixon (2011) has
called ‘slow violence’, the triggering of long-term processes of harm which can only be felt through the erosion of
environments and, I would add, the anticipatory capabilities embedded within them. [136_TD$DIFF] It can therefore be problematic to
represent the future as empty, as open to beingwritten. Indeed, this is itself a political action, insofar as it overwrites the lived
futures through which the future is already being shaped.
4. Conclusion
We have explored how the future is not simply anticipated through being represented and imagined, but is also
anticipated through thematerial organisation of capacities that help to constitute the environment for knowledge and action
in the present. These capacities are not only cognitive and imaginative possession of individual human subjects. Theymay be
affective, but can also be ‘more than human’, being technological or embedded in place and non-human nature. How the
exercise of these capacities is organised, I have argued, can be understood as exhibiting particular patterns that, following
Romanyshyn, Foucault and Deleuze, I have likened to diagrams (Deleuze’s ‘maps of destiny’), abstract orderings which arePlease cite this article in press as: C. Groves, Emptying the future: On the environmental politics of anticipation, Futures (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2016.06.003
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present, making it representable and imaginable in particular ways.
Examples of such diagrams have been elaborated via the example of a siting conﬂict which, I have argued, is a conﬂict
between distinct styles of anticipation that plays out through processes of superimposition and translation. These processes
are facilitated by social institutions (like those through which the land-use planning system is organised) which embody
traditions of prizing and legitimating certain forms of future-oriented knowledge. While this conﬂict is experienced as a
clash of contending interests or values articulated through contrasting visions of future outcomes, it primarily arises from
tension between heterogeneous ways of knowing and taming an uncertain future.
Environmental politics, viewed through the analytical lens developed in this paper, can be understood as the process
through which different styles of anticipation contend in deﬁning public things. Understanding anticipation as a capacity
dependent on a heterogeneous set of human and more-than human capabilities enables us to understand the deeper sense
in which environmental politics is also a politics of the future  not just the future already made over into a product, an
object of concern represented and imagined, but as [137_TD$DIFF]futures-in-the-making into which ﬂows a multiplicity of distinct
activities of anticipation.
Through this kind of perspective, it become possible to think about power relations as modulated through the
construction of the future. Anticipation does not just have rhetorical or performative effects. The representational and
material capacities that are ordered through styles of anticipation are also expressed through forces that shape social,
representational and physical spaces in which public things are constituted. They construct the future as a problem in
different ways at different times and in different places. The politics of anticipation, as environmental politics, concerns the
unequal forms of agency available to different actors for making the future a problem and [138_TD$DIFF]an object of representation and
imagination. Recomposing the relationships between distinct styles of anticipation or future horizons is thus, from this
perspective, a central political problem. Re-integrating abstracting and emptying together with other future horizons is one
way of understanding the task of a critical politics of anticipation.What has been called ‘responsible innovation’ (RI) ( [139_TD$DIFF]Stilgoe,
Owen, &Macnaghten, 2013) represents an intervention in the politics of anticipation that recognises how conﬂicts can arise
between distinct kinds of future-oriented knowledge. With its emphasis on constructing socio-political models for
rendering innovationmore responsive to awider range of social priorities, RI places itself within a tradition of other attempts
to place how the future is anticipated at the heart of politics, including what Moriarty (1999) calls ‘focal engineering’, which
involves the re-embedding of engineering within places and communities. Focal engineering projects work through lived
futures rather than against them, fostering projects like community-owned renewable energy infrastructure that are
responsive to attachments and the social and extra-social relationships that sustain them. Examples of interventions such as
these implicitly recognise that anticipatory capabilities are the connective tissue of political collectivities. They also
implicitly acknowledge, however, that not only are these capabilities unevenly distributed, but that conﬂicts between
different ways of organising them are at the root of the politics of anticipation. [140_TD$DIFF]
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